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Abstract The presented TEM-model describes the economical interaction be-
tween several actors (players) which intend to minimize their emissions (E
i
) caused
by technologies (T
i
) by means of expenditures of money (M
i
) or nancial means, re-
spectively. The index stands for the i-th player, i = 1; : : : ; n. The players are linked
by technical cooperations and the market, which expresses itself in the nonlinear
time-discrete dynamics of the Technology-Emissions-Means-model, in short: TEM-
model. In the sense of environmental protection, the aim is to reach a state which is
mentioned in the Kyoto Protocol by choosing the control parameters such that the
emissions of each player become minimized. The focal point is the realization of the
necessary optimal control parameters via a played cost game, which is determined
by the way of cooperation of the actors. In application to the work of Leitmann,
but not regarding solution sets as feasible sets, the  -value of Tijs [13] is taken as
a control parameter. This leads to a new class of problems in the area of 1-convex
games. We want to solve the problem for a special case. With this solution a rea-
sonable model for a Joint-Implementation process is developed, where its necessary
fund is represented by the non-empty core of the analyzed game. Steering with pa-
rameters of this feasible set, the TEM-model can be regarded as a useful tool to
implement and verify a technical Joint-Implementation Program. For the necessary
data is given to the Clearing House, we are able to compare the numerical results
with real world phenomena.
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1 Introduction - The Kyoto Protocol
The conferences of Rio de Janeiro 1992 and Kyoto 1997 demand for new economic
instruments which have a focus on environmental protection in the macro and micro
economy. An important economic tool being part of the Kyoto Protocol in that area
is Joint-Implementation. It is an international program being part of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol which intends to strenghten international cooperations between enterprises in
order to reduce CO
2
-reductions. A sustainable development can only be guaranteed
if the instrument is embedded in an optimal energy management. Optimal energy
management according to Joint-Implementation means in this context that it must
work on a micro level with minimal costs and it should be protected against misuse
on a macro level.
For that reason, the TEM-Model (Technology-Emissions-Means-Model) was devel-
oped [10], giving the possibility to simulate such an extraordinary market situation.
The case of cooperative economic behavior including co - funding in joint interna-
tional projects is as well considered as the mathematical analysis of several trend
scenarios. This leads to new results in the area of cooperative time-discrete dy-
namic games using discrete optimization techniques and exploiting the underly-
ing combinatorial structure. The realization of Joint-Implementation is determined
by technical and nancial constraints. In a Joint-Implementation Program the re-
duced emissions resulting from technical cooperations are registrated at the Clearing
House. The associated cost reductions should then be allocated in an optimal way.
This approach is as well integrated in the TEM-Model as the possibility to regard
the inuence of several cost-allocations on the feasible set of control parameters. In
the played cost-game a special solution, namely the  value [13] which stands for
a rational allocation process is examined. The main question is in which situations
can the  value be equivalent to the necessary control-parameters in order to reach
the regions, which are mentioned in the Kyoto Protocol. Numerical results are as
well shown as a qualitative analysis of the TEM-Model. The results in the area of
cooperative dynamic games can lead to new insights in Joint-Implementation and
can support an improvement of such an important economical management tool.
2 The TEM-Model
Technology-Emissions-Means-Model
The presented TEM-model describes the economical interaction between several ac-
tors (players) which intend to minimize their emissions (E
i
) caused by technologies
(T
i
) by means of expenditures of money (M
i
) or nancial means, respectively. The
index stands for the i-th player, i = 1; : : : ; n. The players are linked by technical
cooperations and the market, which expresses itself in the nonlinear time-discrete
dynamics of the Technology-Emissions-Means-model, in short: TEM-model.
We want to explain in short in which way can we describe the relationship between
nancial means and reduced emissions in a Joint-Implementation Program with the
following equations:
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Here, em
ij
describes the eect on the emissions of the i-th actor, if the j-th actor
invests money. We can say that it expresses how eective technology coop-
erations are, which is the central element of a Joint-Implementation Program.
Furthermore, we are able to determine the em
ij
-parameter empirically. In the
rst equation the level of the reduced emissions at the t-th time-step depends upon
the last value plus a market eect. This eect expresses itself in the additive terms
which might be negative or positive. In general, E
i
> 0 implies that the actors have
reached yet the demanded value E
i
= 0 (normalized Kyoto-Level). A value E
i
< 0
expresses that the emissions are less than the requirements of the treaty. In the
second equation we see that for such a situation the nancial means will increase
whereas E
i
> 0 leads to a reduction of M
i
(t+ 1):
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The equation contains the logistic functional dependence and the memory parameter
'
i
which describes the eect of the preceeding investment of nancial means. The
dynamics does not guarantee, that the parameter M
i
(t) lies in the interval, which
can be regarded as a budget for the i-th actor
0 M
i
(t)  M

i
; i = 1; : : : ; n and t = 0; : : : ; N:
For that reason we have to add restrictions to the dynamical representation. Then
it is easy to show that
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We have guaranteed that M
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we have developed
a reasonable model for the money expenditure - emission - interaction, where the
inuence of the technologies is integrated in the em-matrix of the system. For an
detailed description we might refer to [10] where the reader furthermore may found
a detailed analysis of the TEM-model. The solutions of the following equations
determine the xed points of the TEM-model:
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Regarding the Jakobi-matrix, we can state that the following eigenvalues
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are not attractive.
3 Numerical example
In the following we will present two numerical examples which will give an intuition
of the economical behavior which is given by the TEM-model. For the following
data set
Emissions Means Budget  1=60 em-Matrix
1 -0.1 30 60 1=60 1 -0.525 -0.475
2 -0.1 20 60 1=60 -0.475 1 0.525
3 -0.1 10 60 1=60 -0.1 -0.1 0.2
we will observe the following oscillations of the reduced emissions and detect an
increase of the nancial means for player 1 ( ), player 2(  ) and player 3 (    ).
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Additionally, for some data set, it is possible to observe chaotic behavior in the
TEM-model.
Actor Emissions Means Budget '  em-Matrix
1 -1 0.3 1 11 0.82 1 -0.7 -0.3
2 0.6 0.1 1 11 0.25 -0.8 1 -0.2
3 0.5 0.2 1 11 0.4 -0.9 -0.1 1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
−2.5
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
time period 2000−2100
re
du
ce
d 
em
iss
io
ns
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
time period 2000−2100
fin
an
cia
l m
ea
ns
 (n
orm
ali
ze
d)
Even though this data is not relevant for practice, it demonstrates the necessity for
a control theoretic approach.
4 The Control Theory
The numerical examinations underline the necessity of a control theoretic approach
which is indicated by an additional control term in the second equation of the
TEM-model.
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According to the Kyoto Protocol this approach means that each actor invests ad-
ditional nancial means. There are several possibilities to solve the problem of
controllability. At this point, we want to concentrate on the feasible sets and their
properties in the area of convex games. For that reason we present only one numer-
ical result which shows that it is possible to steer the system into the xed points.
For a detailed description we might refer to [10].
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5 The core as feasible set
According to the introduction, optimal energy management in the sense of Joint-
Implementation means that it must work on a micro level with minimal costs and
it should be protected against misuse on a macro level. The rst demand is solved
by the control theoretic approach. The second subject can be treatened by adding
constraints to the feasible set of our control parameters. A candidate might be the
construction principle of the core in an cooperative n-person game which is dened
in the following way:
Denition 1
Let v be a n-person game with
v : Pot(N )! R
The Core(v) , is dened by
Core(v) := fy 2 R
n
j
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The core can be seen as a fund, which is constituted at each time-step by a co-
funding process. This approach leads to the Bellmann Functional Equations, which
are treatened in [10]. In the next section we will concentrate us on the construction of
the underlying game. In application to the work of Leitmann [9], but not regarding
solution sets as feasible sets, the  -value of Tijs [13], which has to lie in the core, is
taken in the class of quasibalanced games, as a control parameter.
6 The Cost-Game in the TEM-model
If we regard the nonlinear time-discrete dynamics of the TEM-model
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we can also formulate
E
i
(t+ 1) = E
i
(t) +
n
X
j=1
em
ij
(t)M
j
(t) (6.2)
M
i
(t+ 1) = M
i
(t)  
i
M
i
(t)[M

i
 M
i
(t)]fE
i
(t) + '
i
n
X
j=1
em
ij
(t)M
j
(t)g
considering that E
i
(t) = E
i
(t+ 1)  E
i
(t)
In order to reach steady states, which are determined in [10], an independent
institution may inuence the trade relations between the actors.
In practice, the imposing of taxes or the giving of incentives means that in the TEM-
model the em-parameter will change. Now, the principle of Joint-Implementation
implies that technical cooperation will be benetted:
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For K
i
(t)
i
M
i
(t)  0 the dierence between the cooperative and the non-cooper-
ative case is always positive. So we have constructed a reasonable cost-game. Now,
the method is that at each time step, this amount is put into a central fund. We de-
termine the core for this set and with the  -value, which has to lie in it, we want to
steer the system. Such a determined value can be considered as a favourite candidate
of a co-funding process at each phase of a Joint-Implementation Program. Evalua-
tion of determinants of environmental protection according to Joint-Implementation
should be oriented on that approach. In the next section, we will give a short intro-
duction into the theory of quasibalanced games which guarantees at least that the
 -value is an element of the core.
7 Quasibalanced Games
For the convenience of the reader we repeat the relevant material from [3] and
[14] without proofs, thus makes our exposition self contained. We assume that the
reader is familiar with the terminology of the gap-function, the upper-vector and
the concession vector which are introduced in [13] and [3].
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Using the assumptions that we regard quasibalanced games, we can proof the fol-
lowing theorem
Theorem 1 Let v 2 G
n
and the gap function has the following property g
v
(S)  0
for all S 2 Pot(N ) . Furthermore we have g
v
(N ) = 0 . Then  2 Core(v) .
The main idea of the proof is to take the  -value as a core element. The detailed
proof is left to the reader.
Using the  -value as a control parameter we have to present necessary and suf-
cient conditions for the  -value to belong to the core. In the following we will
concentrate upon quasi-balanced games and regard the core as feasible set of our
control problem.
Theorem 2 Let v 2 QB
v
. If g
v
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Furthermore Core(v) = f (v)g .
Theorem 3 Let v 2 QB
n
and 
v
(S) > 0; S 2 Pot(N ) . The  -value is element
of the Core i the following criteria is valid:
g
v
(S)

v
(S)

g
v
(N )

v
(N )
; S 2 Pot(N ) (7.1)
Furthermore it is possible to prove the theorem under the assumption that the gap
function is positive, i.e. g
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which gives a sucient and necessity condition that the  -value is an element of
the core. In order to check (7.1) and (7.2) it is sucient to examine only the
coalitions 2  jSj  n  1; S 2 Pot(N ) .
Theorem 5 Let v 2 QB
n
and the number of players n 2 f1; 2; 3g . Under these
assumptions the  -value is element of the Core, i.e.
 2 Core(v):
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nition 3 The class of 1-convex games is characterized by the fact that all actors
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By that denition, the concession vector is characterized merely by the grand coali-
tion, i.e. the gap of the grand coalition N is minimal among the gaps of nonempty
coalitions.
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The results of Tijs and Driessen [13] and [3] of this section have nice properties and
their clearness tends to a direct application in the TEM-Model. Nevertheless, our
next goal is to sharphen these results in the context of the TEM-Model and the
underlying cost-game. The aim is to get a representation for our set of the control
parameters which can then be realized by a played cost-game whereas the feasible
set is presented by the core.
8 The Cost-game
According to ( 6.1) and ( 6.2) let us begin with the construction of the cost-game
in the TEM-model
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For simplicity of notation, we write:
~v(!) := v(f1; 2; 3g)(!)
~v() := v(f1; 2g)()
~v() := v(f1; 3g)()
~v() := v(f2; 3g)()
Furthermore we will neglect the index t. For the game will be played at each time-
step separately, we can procede in that way without loss restriction of generality. We
will assume that our game is super-additive. In the following we want to examine
for which parameters our game is 1-convex.
Theorem 7 Let ~v be the game dened by (8.1). The game ~v is 1-convex, if
~v(!) = maxf~v(); ~v(); ~v()g
= minf~v() + ~v(); ~v() + ~v(); ~v() + ~v()g :
Proof 7 First of all, we have to prove that ~v(N )   b
~v
(NnS)  ~v(S) , for all S 2
Pot(N ) .
Let us begin with S = f1; 2; 3g . Then we get
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This nishes the proof.
Now we are able to compute the    value in this 1-convex game.
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Our next concern is to nd a solution of the following system of equations:
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The solution set can be seen as the feasible set of our control problem where each
feasible control vector has to be equivalent to the  -value of a played convex game.
In the following we want to characterize this set.
9 A characterization of the feasible set
Theorem 8 Let v be the cost game which is dened in ( 8.1). Assuming that we
distinguish the following cases of the nondierentiable system ( 8.4) of equations.
We get then the following solutions.
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If the control parameter have the following properties
1. u
1
 0 u
2
 0 u
3
= 0
2. u
1
 0 u
2
= 0 u
3
 0
3. u
1
= 0 u
2
 0 u
3
 0
then we can construct for each case an equivalent 1-convex game.
Proof 8 First of all we have to solve the system of equations for each case. Let us
make the following distinctions. Under the conditions stated above, we get
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Under the hypotheses, mentioned above, we have to prove, wether the conditions are
valid.
Let us begin with the rst case.
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According to Theorem 7 it is sucient for 1-convexity, that
maxfx; y; zg = minfx+ y; y + z; y + zg :
In the following we want to present the proof only for one of the three case-studies.
The approach is similar in all the three cases. The other cases are left to the reader.
Let us concentrate on the rst case. According to that hypothese we get the con-
straints
u
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In addition to ( 9.1) and ( 9.2) we demand now that
x = minfx+ y; y + z; z + xg (9.4)
Without loss restriction of generality, let us assume that the minimum is attained
at y + z . Then we get
x = y + z
u
1
+ u
2
+ u
3
= u
1
+ 2u
3
+ 2u
3
+ u
2
) u
3
= 0 (9.5)
Applying ( 9.3) we obtain u
1
 0 and u
2
 0 .
From the above it follows that
minfx+ y; y + z; z + xg
= minfu
1
+ u
2
+ u
3
+ u
1
+ 2u
3
; u
1
+ 2u
3
+ 2u
3
+ u
2
; u
1
+ u
2
+ u
3
+ 2u
3
+ u
2
g
= minf2u
1
+ u
2
; u
1
+ u
2
; u
1
+ 2u
2
g
= u
1
+ u
2
= y + z
In this way we see that for the case u
3
= 0 the minimum in ( 9.4) is attained at
y + z . This completes the proof. The other cases are left to the reader.
10 A special case - a three person game
Now we will restrict our attention to the case where we have only three actors.
According to the simulation of a Joint-Implementation Program, it is sucient to
deal with such a constellation. We are able to regard the interaction between the
United States of America, the People`s Republic of China and an European country.
According to the above remarks, it was sucient for the  -value being part of the
core, restricted to three person games, that the game is quasibalanced, that means

v
(N )  g
v
(N ) and g
v
(S)  0 :
In comparison to the class of 1-convex games, it is not necessary that the minimum
is attained by g
v
(N ) . For this reason, we can continue in the following way.
Let us start with the condition g
v
(S)  0 . According to lemma 1 it is sucient to
consider the cases g
v
(fig)  0; i 2 S and g
v
(N ) . Given any i

2 S then we can
formulate
g
v
(fi

g) = b
v
i

  v(fi

g) = v(N )   v(Nnfi

g)
We will again assume that our system is super-additive. Additionally we will make
the assumption that the cost-game is zero-normalized. In [10] the reader may nd
criteria which guarantee super-additivity and zero-normality. Basing on this pre-
suppositions it follows that g
v
(fi

g)  0 .
Concerning the grand coalition fNg , we may formulate:
g
v
(N ) = b
v
(N )   v(N ); N = f1; 2; 3g
= b
v
1
+ b
v
2
+ b
v
3
  v(f1; 2; 3g)
= v(N )   v(Nnf2; 3g) + v(N )   v(Nnf1; 3g) + v(N )   v(Nnf1; 2g)
 v(f1; 2; 3g)
We conclude from v(f1; 2; 3g) 
v(f1;2g)+v(f1;3g)+v(f2;3g)
2
that g
v
(N )  0 .
Applying the second condition for Quasibalancedness
(N )  g
v
(N )

v
1
+ 
v
2
+ 
v
3
 g
v
(f1; 2; 3g) (10.1)
 b
v
1
+ b
v
2
+ b
v
3
  v(f1; 2; 3g)
leads to the following distinctions:
1. Let us begin with the case where the concession vector is, without loss restriction
of generality, dened by 
v
1
= g
v
(f1; 2; 3g) .
For g
v
(S)  0; S 2 N it yields (10.1).
2. We now turn to the case where the concession vector is, without loss restriction
of generality, dened by 
v
1
= g
v
(f1; 2g).
According to lemma 1 we have g
v
(f1; 2g) = g
v
(f1; 2; 3g) . From what has al-
ready been proved it follows that (10.1) is valid.
3. It remains to consider the case 
v
1
= g
v
(f1g); 
v
2
= g
v
(f2g); 
v
3
= g
v
(f3g).
It is easily seen that
b
v
1
+ b
v
2
+ b
v
3
  v(f1g)   v(f2g)   v(f3g) =
b
v
1
+ b
v
2
+ b
v
3
 b
v
(f1; 2; 3g)  v(f1; 2; 3g) = g
v
(N ) (10.2)
From what has already been proved we conclude that the condition
v(f1; 2; 3g) 
v(f1; 2g) + v(f1; 3g) + v(f2; 3g)
2
(10.3)
represents again an equivalent problem. The crucial fact is that now only the condi-
tion ( 10.3) is valid. Under these conditions we may determine the  -value for an
3-person quasibalanced game by:

1
= b
v
1
 

v
1

v
(f1; 2; 3g)
g
v
(f1; 2; 3g)

2
= b
v
2
 

v
2

v
(f1; 2; 3g)
g
v
(f1; 2; 3g)

3
= b
v
3
 

v
3

v
(f1; 2; 3g)
g
v
(f1; 2; 3g)
For the game is supposed to be zero-normalized, and we have
g
v
(fig) = v(f1; 2; 3g)  v(f1; 2; 3gnfig)
and
g
v
(f1; 2; 3g) = b
v
1
+ b
v
2
+ b
v
3
  v(f1; 2; 3g)
= 2v(f1; 2; 3g)  v(f1; 2g)  v(f1; 3g)  v(f2; 3g)
according to lemma 1

v
i
= min[g
v
(fig); g
v
(f1; 2; 3g)]
For simplicity, let us introduce the following abbreviations,

v
1
= minfg
v
(f1g); g
v
(f1; 2; 3g)g = f(x; y; z; w)

v
2
= minfg
v
(f2g); g
v
(f1; 2; 3g)g = g(x; y; z; w)

v
3
= minfg
v
(f3g); g
v
(f1; 2; 3g)g = h(x; y; z; w)
with x := v(f1; 2g) y := v(f1; 3g) z = v(f2; 3g) w = v(f1; 2; 3g)
According to this, we obtain the following representation

1
= w   z  
f(x; y; z; w)
f(x; y; z; w) + g(x; y; z; w) + h(x; y; z; w)
[2w   x  y   z] := u
1

2
= w   y  
g(x; y; z; w)
f(x; y; z; w) + g(x; y; z; w) + h(x; y; z; w)
[2w   x  y   z] := u
2

3
= w   x 
h(x; y; z; w)
f(x; y; z; w) + g(x; y; z; w) + h(x; y; z; w)
[2w   x  y   z] := u
3
From (10.3) we obtain additionally as fourth condition for our so called equivalent
problem:
2w   x  y   z = ;   0
The equivalence set is the solution set of the following system of equations.
0
B
@
u
1
u
2
u
3

1
C
A
=
0
B
B
@
1 
2f
f+g+h
f
f+g+h
f
f+g+h
f
f+g+h
  1
1 
2g
f+g+h
g
f+g+h
g
f+g+h
  1
g
f+g+h
1 
2h
f+g+h
h
f+g+h
  1
h
f+g+h
h
f+g+h
2  1  1  1
1
C
C
A
0
B
@
w
x
y
z
1
C
A
(10.4)
Numerical examples show that the solution set is not empty. This fact means that
after a successive co-funding process which might be coordinated by the institution
of the clearing house mentioned in the Kyoto Protocol it is possible to steer the
control problem in an optimal way with the  -value. Additionaly the  -value lies
in the core of an equivalent game. This is a new result in the area of dynamic
cooperative games.
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